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28 December 1948

OGC HAS REVIEWED.

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR

Subject: Publicity Concerning Intelligence

Reference: (a) The Navy's Draft with Enclosures re a Proposed NSCID on above subject, received at IAC Meeting 3 Dec 1948

1. The members of ICAPS have talked over this matter and have also talked it over with the Office of General Counsel. We all think it is a matter primarily for the Services themselves to control and not the subject for a NSCID.

2. With regard to the Navy's "Proposed NSCID," paragraph 1(a), "Departments and Agencies of the United States Government shall not permit the disclosure for publication of any information concerning intelligence or intelligence activities," this is certainly the way things should be run by the Departments and Agencies, but isn't that a matter of enforcing departmental standing regulations?

3. Paragraph 1(b) of the Navy's suggestions is impracticable. Mr. Forrestal recently had no success, as we understand it, in asking the press to cooperate in not publishing National Security matters. This information should be controlled at the source within the Departments. If security regulations were really enforced, there would be but little trouble.

4. We think that you should not submit to the NSC the proposed letter to publishers and the suggested mailing list. The NSC is definitely not interested in handling operating details, nor should the President be called upon to appeal to people outside of the Government until our own house is in order.


5. The Services now have powers to stop their retired officers as well as active personnel from activities inimical to the interests of National Security.

6. It must be realized that the main difficulty in achieving the goal suggested by the Navy lies in the fact that most disclosures of intelligence-type data are made by inactive reservists, who are controlled very little by Service regulations.

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7. The Public Relations Officers in the various departments are already established, we believe, as the proper channels for press relations. The respective Chiefs of Intelligence could be designated by the Departmental Secretaries for controlling the release of all data on intelligence matters.



9. However, if an impasse should develop in one of the departments, you would probably be on firmer ground if the NSC supported you and specifically "directed" that you protect sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

RECOMMENDATIONS

You may wish to discuss either or both of the following recommendations at an early IAO Meeting:

1. That you discuss this subject informally with various Secretaries, pointing out that under Section 102(d)(3), the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. In view of the fact that so many articles have been appearing lately in Collier's, the Saturday Evening Post, Life, et cetera, the press, and on the radio, the Secretaries may be willing to issue orders (and enforce them) to cut off this information at the source.

2. If you think it necessary to go into this problem in more detail, that you have some competent person in the Office of Special Operations or Inspection and Security analyze these published articles for specific violations about unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods. But, if your informal presentation of this matter to the Secretaries is successful, this may not be necessary.

PRESOTT CHILDS
Chief, ICAPS

cc: General Counsel ✓

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